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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In July 2002, Todd and Tonia Green bought a % section of undeveloped land a few miles
north of Moscow, Idaho on the ridge overlooking Moscow. A few months after the purchase and
after Greens' surveyor had put up ribbons as part of his survey, Weitz, the landowner to the north
of Greens' property, bulldozed a dirt road on Greens' property near its northern edge. This brief
will often refer to appellants collectively as "Weitz" for clarity and convenience. After this
bulldozing, Consuelo Weitz told Todd Green that she owned about 8%acres of his land. Lawyers
were employed on both sides, and in February 2004 Weitz filed suit claiming ownership based
on a theory of boundary by agreement. By this time the Greens had sold portions of their tract to
Steven and Mary Shook and Danial and Catherine Castle. Greens, Shooks, and Castles were
named as defendants in the Weitz suit and in this brief will all often be referred to collectively as
"Green".
As part of the sale agreements to Shooks and Castles Mr. and Mrs. Green agreed to
defend any suit brought by Weitz, and the Greens have done so. In addition, the agreements
specified that if any land was lost to Weitz, the Greens were to reimburse Shook and Castle at
the purchase price per acre for any land lost. This has not been necessary since the Greens were
successfbl in defending their title against Weitz.
In December 2002, the Greens' lawyer wrote to the lawyer for Weitz notifying Weitz to
stop trespassing and not to do any damage to the land. The alleged fence which was claimed by
Weitz as the boundary had long since fallen down and for the most part disappeared. In July
2003, about one year after the Greens' purchase, Weitz went upon the Green, Shook, and Castle

land to build a new fence, and in the process cut down 240 trees.
Green, Shook, and Castle responded to the Weitz lawsuit with an answer and a
counterclaim for slander of title, trespass, violation of I. C. 5 6-202. Actions for Trespass, and for
damages.
The case progressed. Eventually, as a result of continued trespasses by Weitz, and
because Weitz had been changing evidence on the ground, Green brought a motion for
preliminary injunction to keep Weitz off the property. The court granted the preliminary
injunction on April 15,2005.
The suit was contentious. Many motions were brought and ruled upon by the court. In
October 2005, the six day trial (one day in April and five in October) was concluded. The court
rendered a decision denying all of Weitz's claims. The court found that Weitz had trespassed
and awarded $500.00 each to Greens, Shooks, and Castles. Green (all three couples) brought a
motion to reconsider, and the court granted the motion. The court then issued an Amended
Memorandum Decision in which the court, on page I, states "This Amended Memorandum
Decision supersedes and replaces" the court's first decision.
Counsel for Green does not understand why Weitz's brief cites from the first decision
which is now a nullity; but it does, and this creates confusion.
In the court's amended and final decision, it granted Green's slander of title claim but
continued to adhere to its earlier position denying the application of LC.

3 6-202 and awarding

only $500.00 to each couple. After post trial motions Green was awarded part of his attorney
fees and most of his costs. Weitz appealed and Greens, Shooks, and Castles cross-appealed.

Factual Statement
Not surprisingly, Green finds many of the facts asserted by Weitz throughout its brief to
be false or exaggerated. It would take this entire brief to correct the errors. The trial court found
Weitz guilty of recklessly making false statements. Green feels that this pattern has continued
in Weitz's brief.
Green would like to comment on a few examples of factual assertions in Weitz's brief
which distort the testimony. On page 1 Weitz makes the cute statement that "the fence line acted
as a peaceful and mutually respected property boundary through the .... [here follows a long list
of historic events]. .." Unfortunately, the word "mutually" is false, and the trial court's decision
explains that the only testimony to this effect was "undermined" and thus not credible. R Vol.
VIII, p. 1639. In addition, Green introduced evidence showing Rogers, Green's predecessor in
interest, logged in the disputed area. Tr p. 1790, L. 2 to p. 1791, L. 11. This will be discussed at
length later.
On page 8 it is asserted that Weitz (actually the predecessor in interest) leased a portion
of the disputed property to others. The lease, however, does not purport to lease property in the
disputed area, but leases only in the area included in Weitz's predecessors' deed.
Green used an expert, Thomas Richards, to calculate and explain trespass damages.
Green has always asserted that the proper measure of damages was the cost of replacing the cut
trees, and Mr. Richards addressed this in detail. In case the court did not agree that this was the
correct measure, Green also had Mr. Richards prepare an analysis of the value of the trees as
merchantable timber. This was a complex analysis because most of the trees cut were not mature.

On page 16, Weitz's brief makes an effort to show that Mr. Richards felt it was an error
to replace the trees. The transcript makes it clear that Mr. Brown was questioning Richards
about the merchantable timber value calculation and then asked him if it would be sensible to
replace a suppressed tree with another suppressed tree. This of course had nothing to do with
valuing trees as merchantable timber and in no way represented the replacement plan to which
Mr. Richards had already testified. In short, Mr. Brown posed a hypothetical, unrelated to the
case, and then in his brief used the answer to imply that Mr. Richards was describing his own
plan as "unwise and stupid". Mr. Richards' testimony begins at Tr p.1545, and his replanting
plan is found in Exhibit TT.
Green agrees with the trial judge's factual findings, except for the damage award, which
Green asserts resulted from a legal error, not a factual error. In fact, the record mandates most of
the facts found by the court. For this reason, Green will not engage in repeating Judge Stegner's
excellent recital of the facts as set out in his Amended Memorandum Decision, but instead that
decision is attached to this brief as an addendum. Green suggests reading the first four pages of
that Amended Memorandum Decision at this time. Green in this brief will frequently refer to
that decision, so its attachment will facilitate reading this brief. For convenience the page
numbers in the attached decision are both the original numbers from 1 to 13 and the numbers as
they appear in the Clerk's Record.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

With regard to Green's claim that Idaho Code

3

6-202. Actions for Trespass. should

apply to the act of Mr. and Mrs. Weitz in cutting down 240 trees, the trial court made a legal

error. The court incorrectly found that even though Weitz was "unreasonable" in her mental
state and was "unreasonable" in cutting down the trees, I.C. 5 6-202 was not applicable.
2.

The court made a legal error in the award of damages for the 240 trees cut by Mr. and

Mrs. Weitz when it based its award for the temporary injury to property on the merchantable
value of the trees cut, instead of using the correct measure of the cost of restoring the trees.
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Green claims attorney fees on appeal for the following reasons.
1.

Weitz was found to have slandered Green's title and attorney fees should be awarded on

that basis as special damages.
2.

Weitz's appeal simply invites the appellate court to substitute its findings of fact for those

of the trial court, when the evidence and record support all of the trial court's factual findings.
This justifies an award for attorney fees under I.C.

9

12-121. See Downey V: Vavold, 166 P.3d

382; (ID 2007) at page 386.
3.

If this Court finds that the trial court made a legal error in not applying I.C. (i 6-202, then

Greens should also be awarded attorney fees pursuant to this statute.
ARGUMENT

I. BONA FIDE PURCHASER FOR VALUE
Idaho law regarding the protections offered to a bona fide purchaser for value (hereafter
BFP) has been well established for over 100 years and was beautifully expressed by this Court in
Langroise v. Becker, 96 Idaho 218,526 P.2d 178, 180 (1974 Sup Ct) when it said at page 220:

The purpose of the recording act in a race-notice jurisdiction, like Idaho, is to allow
recorded interests to be effective against unrecorded interests when the recorded
interest is taken for a valuable consideration and in good faith, i. e., without
knowledge, either actual or constructive, that unrecorded interests exist. Froman v.
Madden, 13 Idaho 138, 88 P. 894 (1907). To rule upon this question in the manner
urged by the bank and title company would allow a purchaser or encumbrancer with
actual knowledge of adversepossession, or of a boundary dispute not based upon a
written instrument, to eliminate all rights inconsistent with those in his deed merely
by recording. We cannot believe that this was the intent of the legislature in enacting
a race-notice statute. One who purchases or encumbrances with notice of
inconsistent claims does not take in good faith, and one who fails to investigate the
open or obvious inconsistent claim cannot take in good faith. Amerco, Inc. v. Tullar,
182 Cal.App.2d 336, 6 Cal.Rptr. 71 (1960). (emphasis added)
Whether Green was a BFP with regard to the Weitz claim was a factual matter to be
determined by the trial court and not to be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous.
See Hunter, 131 Idaho 148, 953 P.2d 588 (1998), as cited in Baxter v. Craney, 135
Idaho 166, 174, 16 P.3d 263, 271. "Accordingly, because the district court's decision
is supported by substantial and competent, although conflicting, evidence, this Court
will not disturb its conclusion." See also Anderson K Rex Hayes Family Trust,
2008-ID-R0508.001, at page 3. "A trial court's findings of fact will be set aside only
if clearly erroneous, which means that they were not supported by substantial,
competent evidence. Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 506, 65 P.3d 525, 528 (2003).
The trial court found that Green qualified as a BFP. R Vol. VIII, p.1643. The evidence
which supports this finding was overwhelming. The "fence" which was supposed to give notice
of the Weitz's boundaty by agreement claim was, after more than a year of false description by
Weitz, finally described truthfully when Mrs. Weitz, testified that:
Well, my grandfather's last cattle left the place - I think the last one died or was sold
in 1972. And to my knowledge the fence wasn't maintained after that time and it
just gradually became dilapidated and it fell into the ground. Tr p. 256, L. 7-1 1.
In Idaho, fences that were down over much of their length have been consistently held as

inadequate to provide notice of a boundary by agreement claim to a purchaser. See Standall v.
Teater, 96 Idaho 152, 525 P.2d 347; Grflel v. Reynolds, 136 Idaho 397, 34 P.3d 1080; Persyn v.
Favreau, 119 Idaho 154,804 P.2d 327.
This "fence" was so completely down that in his many trips over the property before
purchasing, Todd Green never saw Weitz's alleged boundary "fence". In his testimony Todd
Green also said that he never saw anything that caused him to feel that he needed to make
inquiry. Tr p. 80, L. 9 to p. 81, L. 1; p. 88, L. 25 to p. 89, L. 4; p. 1222, L. 5-1 1; p.1454, L. 24 to
p. 1455, L. 17.
The argument made at the bottom of page 22 of Weitz's brief, that Mr. Shook - Weitz
meant Mr. Green - noticed the disputed fence line 19 times, is disingenuous. It fails to note that
these 19 photographs were taken after Mr. Green had been told by Mrs. Weitz that there was a
"fence" that she claimed as a boundary. Mr. Green testified that these photographs were taken
as part of a detailed search for any evidence of a fence on his property. Tr p. 1455, L. 14 to p.
1456, L. 13. The fact that a detailed search after the purchase and after oral notice from Mrs.
Weitz turned up so little evidence of an alleged fence, that was supposed to be more than 2500
feet long, fully supports Mr. Green's repeated under oath statements that he saw no fence before
purchasing.
The alleged "seamless, interconnecting road system" was just another of Weitz's
misrepresentations. It was, as the Court found, nothing more than a "footpath" that "would not
have put a reasonably observant purchaser on notice that someone other than the deeded owner
of the property claimed title to the disputed property." R Vol. VII, p. 1462.

The testimony of multiple witnesses supports this finding. These include: Ronald Monson
Tr p.718, L. 10 to p. 721, L. 10; Michael O'Neal, Tr p. 1698, L. 11 to p. 1699, L. 8; Willemina
Kardong, Tr p. 1715, L. 19 top. 1716, L. 15; Linda Fox, Tr p. 1741, L. 1 top. 1742, L 1; and p.
1745, L. 5 top. 1746, L. 19.
Weitz again makes a disingenuous argument at page 25 of its brief by asserting that
photographs "taken in the year 2003, clearly show a road." Weitz fails to mention that in late
2002, well after Todd Green purchased the property and at the time this dispute arose, Mr. Weitz
drove a bulldozer onto the Green property and created the dirt road depicted in the 2003 and
2005 photos. The evidence of the October 2002 bulldozing comes not just from Green's
witnesses, but from Mr. Weitz himself when he testified to this bulldozing. Tr p. 289, L. 1 to p.
291, L. 6. Of course the Court based its finding of a "footpath" on the testimony of the many
witnesses (four disinterested ones are listed above) who described its condition, during the
relevant time period, as a single file footpath.
The shack (referred to by Weitz as the "radio shack") was found by the court to be "a
dilapidated structure that has not been used in decades." The Court further found that "to the
extent it was seen prior to purchase, it would not have put a purchaser on notice of a contrary
claim to ownership."

R Vol. VIII, p. 1642. The photograph of the dangerously dilapidated and

tiny shack, in evidence as Exhibit NN, fully supports the Court's finding.
The cases cited by Weitz regarding structures involved substantial structures that were
still in use or in very recent use. Some cases cited by Weitz involved houses in which people
were living. Cases such as these shed no light upon the notice value o f a tiny collapsing shack

sitting alone on 160 acres of land. Such a structure could have been placed by any previous
owner of the Green land for any number of possible uses. It provided no notice to Green, a BFP.
Although Weitz have not argued that the rusted steel drum top attached to a tree with the
word "LINE" cut in it provided notice, the Court found that this would not have put a BFP on
notice of Weitz's land claim. The trial record hlly supports this finding. Exhibit MM shows
this rusty sign, although at the time of purchase by Mr. Green no orange ribbon was on the tree.
The location of the sign is shown in Exhibit 3 as "LINE TREE (SIGN)". Exhibit 3 shows that
the sign is not near or on any property line or alleged property line. The sign is not near the
alleged boundary fence. No one seeing that sign would conclude that someone was claiming
ownership, especially in Idaho where claims of adverse possession or boundary by agreement
require fences, cultivation, or improvements that mark the length of the boundary.
Finally, Mrs. Weitz testified that this "LINE" sign was put up by her father to designate
some north-south boundary line and not to give notice of the claim in this case, which is based
on a generally east-west "fence" line. Tr p. 258, L. 9-16. The trial court's finding that this sign
would not put a BFP on notice that more than eight acres was being claimed by another is &illy
supported by the record.
11. SHELTER RULE

Although Weitz has not argued that Shook and Castle do not have the equivalent of BFP
status, it is worthwhile at this point to mention that as purchasers from a BFP, Shook and Castle
are sheltered in Green's BFP status. Sun Valley Land & Minerals, Inc. v. Buvt, 123 Idaho 862,
868,853 P.2d 607 (Ct. App. 1993).

111. SITE VIEW BY THE TRIAL JUDGE
Weitz at page 25 of its brief seems to fault the trial judge for viewing the site and seems
to imply without so stating that the judge relied on information uniquely gained at this view in
reaching his decision. Although this attack is only implied, it is unfounded and unfair.
In his final 13 page Amended Memorandum Decision the judge made only two passing
references to his site view. Neither of these occurred in the lengthy opening statement of facts.
The first reference to his site view occurred at page 5, R Vol. VIII, p. 1640, when the
judge noted that the "fence" was actually the "remains of a fence." This was the evidence given
by everyone at trial including Mrs. Weitz when she admitted that the fence just "fell into the
ground." The next sentence in that decision just notes agreement with the evidence of most, if
not all, of the witnesses at trial, including even Nancy Flisher, a Weitz witness. She said in
describing the disputed fence as it existed in 1979 to 1986: "You know, maybe the wire was
down here and there." Tr p. 987, L. 7. "I'm not sure it would hold animals any more." Tr p.
988, L. 6. Thomas Richards, an expert testifying from aerial photographs, said of this fence: "In
my opinion, I would have to say probably - it was down in 1987." Tr p. 1563, L 20.
The second reference to his site view occurred on page 7 when in one sentence the judge
stated that "This court, having had the opportunity to physically walk the fence line and hear the
testimony at trial, is persuaded that the Greens were bona fide purchasers of the disputed
property." R Vol. VIII, p. 1642. The judge said in the very next sentence following his mention
of site view, "much testimony was elicited regarding the 'fence'." R Vol. VIII p. 1642. The court
made its findings based upon that testimony, including of course the Exhibits admitted during

that testimony. The court's findings are all the result of overwhelming evidence presented at
trial. Viewing a site to help evaluate and apply the evidence submitted at trial is entirely proper,
as stated in the very case cited by Weitz, Akers v. Mortenson, Idaho 2008, Opinion number 68.
See also Gilbert v. City ofCaldwel1, 112 Idaho 386,397,398,732 P.2d 355,366,367.
The trier of the facts is positioned to observe the demeanor of witnesses and correctly
relies on this form of evidence, which does not appear in the record, in evaluating the credibility
of testimony and the weight to assign it. A site view plays the same role. It provides a form of
evidence that permits the trier of the facts to evaluate and better apply the evidence, including
oral testimony and pictures placed in the trial record.
In excess of 150 pictures and aerial photographs were introduced at trial. Numerous
surveys and diagrams were introduced. Exhibit KK used 56 photographs taken at 100 foot
intervals from both sides of the alleged fence to provide pictorial evidence of its absence over its
entire length. Exhibit EE used 19 photographs to show the alleged fence in November of 2002.
The trial evidence left nothing relevant to this case un-photographed. The fact that the judge in
his decision mentioned walking the fence line in the same sentence in which he also noted
hearing the testimony at trial just shows that his evaluation of the evidence was assisted by his
view of the site. There is no basis to conclude that any of the judge's findings are based
exclusively on his site view.
The court never states that it has based any of its findings of fact exclusively on the site
view, and all of the findings are supported by evidence in the trial record. There is nothing the
court could have viewed which is not covered by photographic exhibits admitted at trial. It

should be noted that the viewing by the court occurred with the consent and in the presence of all
counsel, with a court reporter present in case any discussion occurred. Tr p. 446, L. 4-25.

IV. BOUNDARY BY AGREEMENT
Green's standing as a BFP defeated all of Weitz's claims except the claim based on
quasi-estoppel. However, the trial court in its Amended Memorandum Decision also explained
why Weitz's claims for boundary by agreement and for prescriptive easement would fail even
without resort to Green's BFP status.
Even if Weitz had been able to overcome Green's BFP status, in order to prevail against
Green on this theory, Weitz would have had to prove two things by clear and convincing
evidence. First, Weitz would have had to prove an uncertain or disputed boundary involving
adjacent properties; and second, Weitz would have had to prove a subsequent express or implied
agreement fixing the boundary. Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264, 127 P.3d 167 (2005), (citing Russ
Ballard & Family Achievement Inst. v. Lava Hot Springs Resort, Znc., 97 Idaho 572, 579, 548

P.2d 72, 79 (1976)). Cox v. Clanton, 137 Idaho 492,495, 50 P.3d 987,990 (2002) (citing Gnflel v.
Reynolds, 136 Idaho 397,400,34 P.3d 1080, 1083 (2001)).

The trial court found that Weitz failed to prove an express or implied agreement by clear and
convincing evidence. R Vol. VIII, p. 1639.
In addition to the testimony described by the court in support of its finding, there is the
testimony of both Green's and Weitz's surveyors that only remnants of a fence remained. Also
Mrs. Weitz's admitted that after her father stopped having cattle in 1972, there were no more
repairs and the fence was allowed to fall into the ground. Tr p. 256, L. 7-1 1.

In trying to locate the remains of the alleged fence, both surveyors testified to a zigzag
line running between trees. Both surveyors found that the alleged fence line was in some places
75 or more feet further from the true line than in other places and thus was not even close to
parallel to the quarter-section line which was the true boundary.
Surveyor Monson, employed by Green, testified that the remnants were so sparse that it
was not possible at the time of trial to locate the original fence. Tr p. 710, L. 7 to p. 712, L. 22.
Surveyor Priest, employed by Weitz, testified that the fence zigzagged. Tr p. 1054, L. 4-10. Mr.
Priest also testified that he came to a point where the fence line went off in two directions and so
he just chose one. Tr p. 1044, L. 8 to p. 1045, L. 12.
The land claimed by Weitz is more than eight acres and constitutes a substantial portion
of Green's land.
These facts bring our case squarely within the holding in Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264,

In our prior cases, we have applied the presumption when it was reasonable to
assume from the facts on the ground that at some prior point landowners agreed or
acquiesced to a certain location as the boundary -between their properties.
However, the shape of Parcel A is so irregular and encompasses such a large
portion of the Marble property that such an assumption would be unreasonable.
Therefore, since Luce cannot rely on this presumption and failed to present any
evidence the fence lines surrounding Parcel A settled an actual disagreement or
uncertainty, she cannot establish her right to Parcel A through boundary by
agreement or acquiescence.
The aerial photographs produced by both sides show that this "fence" roughly followed
the northern edge of pasture land on the property Rogers sold to Green. Tom Rogers testified to
the use of the fence to control cattle. Tr p. 1763, L. 8-11. Thomas Richards, an aerial

photograph expert, testified that the aerial photos admitted in evidence from 1987 showed that
trees were cut in the disputed area and skidded down to the landing on Rogers' property. Tr p.
1790, L. 2 to p. 1791, L. 11. This confirmed Mr. Rogers' testimony regarding logging in the
area by the Rogers in the same time frame. This shows that the Rogers used the land north of the
zigzag cattle fence as their own land, did not view the fence as an ownership boundary, and
clearly had not agreed to or acquiesced in the "fence" as a boundary.
The totality of the evidence brings our case eerily close to Cox v. Clanton, 137 Idaho 492,
50 P.3d 987 (2002). In that case the court refused to apply the presumption that a fence implied a
boundary agreement when, taken as a whole, the evidence showed the fence was hastily
constructed to control cattle. The foregoing evidence and law adequately supports the trial
court's finding that Weitz failed to meet its burden on the issue of express or implied agreement
or acquiescence.
A more recent Idaho case sheds more light on the burden of a party claiming boundary by

agreement or acquiescence. In Downey, despite a standing fence that existed for at least 25 years
close to and parallel to the property boundary, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court
finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove a boundary by agreement.
Although an agreement can be inferred from a long period of acquiescence, the
trial court is not required to draw that inference. "Acquiescence in the location
and maintenance of a line fence for a great length of time may he presumptive
evidence of an agreement as to the true boundary line, but is not conclusive
evidence."Brown v. Brown, 18 Idaho 345, 357, 110 P. 269, 273 (1910); accord
Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264, 127 P.3d 167 (2005) (specific facts of the case
can prevent this presumption from operating).
In this case, any agreement establishing an uncertain boundary would have to be

inferred from the conduct of the parties viewed in light of the surrounding
circumstances. Id. Since acquiescence is evidence of an agreement establishing
the boundary, the relevant conduct to show acquiescence would be that of the
parties to the alleged agreement. The conduct of subsequent owners, or their
understandings as to the boundary, would not prove or disprove an implied
agreement between Mr. Conner and his neighbors at the time he erected the fence.
In order for Mr. Conner to have acquiesced in his neighbors' claims that the fence
was the boundary, they must have done something that would put him on notice
that they were claiming the fence was the boundary. At the time Mr. Conner built
the fence, the land abutting his property to the west was unimproved. Downey V.
Vuvold, 166 P.3d 382; (ID 2007), (at pages 385,386) (emphasis added)

Downey also awarded attorney fees to the respondent because the plaintiffs simply
invited the appellate court to second-guess the trial court on conflicting evidence. Id.

V. PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT
The trial court focused its attention on three defects in Weitz's prescriptive easement
claim:
The first was the BFP issue. Baxter v. Cruney, 135 Idaho 166, 174, 16 P.3d 263, 271
(2000), dealt with this issue as it relates to our case perfectly when it said:
The Baxters also contend that the Craneys took possession of the land with
knowledge of the easement. As evidence of their knowledge, the Baxters point to
testimony that the Craneys inspected the land prior to their purchase and observed
the trails. An examination of the relevant testimony in the record, however, merely
establishes that the Craneys were aware of the trails at the time of purchase. The
Craneys' mere appreciation of the abundant trails, without more, is insufficient to
establish that the Craneys were put on notice of a prescriptive easement across
their land Accordingly, because the district court's decision is supported by
substantial and competent, although conflicting, evidence, this Court will not disturb
its conclusion. See Hunter, 131 Idaho 148,953 P.2d 588 (1998). (emphasis added)
Second, the trial court focused on the need for continuous use for the five-year period.
Again, this is a question of fact for the trial court to determine. Weitz's evidence showed

infrequent and sporadic use of this property for recreation. The trial court's finding is well
supported by the record. It is noteworthy that a careful review of Weitz's evidence on this issue
presents no identifiable five-year period when the continuous, uninterrupted use requirement
would be met. The court found that, "Although there was evidence the Weitz family and their
friends used the trail periodically during the period in question, the use was not continuous." R Vol.
VIII, p. 1641.
Although the trial court did not rely on it, the doctrine established in Cox v. Cox, 84 Idaho
513, 373 P.2d 929 (1962), applies to our case. In Cox the court stated that in a claim of
prescriptive easement over wild, undeveloped, or unfenced land, the usual presumption that the
use is adverse does not apply. Instead, there is a presumption that the use was permissive and not
adverse. The photographic evidence established by Exhibits EE 1-20, HH 1-13, KK and the
aerial photographs show that the Cox holding applies to our case.
The amorphous testimony of recreational and nondestructive uses by the Weitz family
and their witnesses did not and could not overcome the presumption of permissive and nonadverse use. Cox and its progeny specifically created the permissive presumption because
landowners often allow public access as the Rogers did. This is now in effect the public policy
of Idaho because the legislature has offered liability protection to landowners who permit public
recreational use oftheir land. (See I.C. 3 36-1604)
Third, the Court found the exclusive use requirement as set out in Simmons v. Perkins, 63
Idaho 136, 118 P2d 740 (1941) was not met. The record is filled with the testimony of witnesses
who are members of the public who used the ridge trail on the disputed property for recreation.

These include Nancy Flisher, Harley Wright, Lenard Wright, Michael O'Neal, Wiilemina
Kardong, Linda Fox, Steven Shook and Todd Green. Further, the testimony of Tom Rogers
showed his awareness and acceptance of public use. Tr p. 1757, L 5 to p. 1758, L 3.
These problems for Weitz

-

no identifiable five-year continuous use period and non-

exclusive use -impact not only its prescriptive easement claim, hut also its claim regarding the
request to amend its complaint to add adverse possession. Adverse possession also requires a
showing of an identifiable five-year continuous use period and exclusive use, as will be
discussed later.

VL QUASI-ESTOPPEL
Quasi-estoppel has no application to our case.
"Quasi-estoppel prevents a party from reaping an unconscionable advantage, or
from imposing an unconscionable disadvantage upon another, by changing
positions." Garner V. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430,437, 80 P.3d 1031, 1038 (2003),
citing Lunders V. Estate ofsnyder, 131 Idaho 689,695,963 P.2d 372,378 (1998).
Both elements, changed position and unconscionahility, are missing from our case.
Changed Position. Weitz introduced four exhibits related to quasi-estoppel, exhibits 8,
9, 10, and 48. By the time Greens made their arrangement with Rogers as set out in Exhibit 10,
Greens had already contractually agreed to defend the titles of Shook and Castle, purchasers
from Greens. See Exhibit 9, paragraph 4 (Shook), and Exhibit 8, paragraph 4 (Castle).
Exhibit 10, the Rogers-Green agreement, contains four paragraphs relevant to the quasiestoppel claim. The recitals on page 1 of the agreement contain the following three paragraphs:

7. Both Greens and Rogers deny that the disputed fence is the actual and
legal boundary between the Greens property and Weitz property.

8. Weitz has indicated they will file a quiet title action to vest title in the
disputed property in Weitz.
9. Greens have informed Rogers that Greens will tender the defense of the
quiet title action to Rogers, based upon the Warranty Deed received from Rogers,
the contract documents and Idaho law.
The mutual covenants and undertakings of the agreement contain the following paragraph:
16. Greens hereby release and relinquish any and all claims, rights, causes
of action and damages against Rogers concerning the disputed property, and agree
to indemnify and hold Rogers harmless from any claim of Weitz or their
successors in interest concerning the disputed property. (on page 2)
Thus the promises made to defend the titles of Shook and Castle combined with contents
of the Rogers-Green settlement show unequivocally that Green has always asserted the validity
of his title as against Weitz.
Further, the three contractual relationships Todd and Toiiia Green had with Shook,
Castle, and Rogers required Greens to take the very position Greens took against Weitz. This
cannot be construed as a change in position.
Weitz's brief makes an argument at page 40 by showing calculations from a letter sent by
attorney Magyar to attorney Brower on July 17, 2003, but fails to include the full introduction to
the calculations. The full introduction, found in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 48, appears below.

I have discussed your suggestion that we mediate the issues between our clients
with Todd and Tonia Green. We agree with your assessment that both Rogers
and Greens find themselves in this predicament as a result of the questionable
action by Weitz, and that neither of our clients should have to be in this position.
However, Greens did purchase a specific 160 acre parcel from your client, and by
virtue of the contract and related documents, they are entitled to have Rogers clear
title to that property. In the event Rogers cannot clear title to the property, then
Greens are entitled to recover their damages, and the loss of value of the
respective parcels is included in those damages.

I promised to send you a current summary of the damages to and costs incurred
by Todd and Tonia Green that directly result from Weitz claiming ownership of
the approximately 9 acres that were sold to the Greens by your clients. That
summary is as follows:
The calculations shown in Weitz's brief immediately followed the above introduction.
The fact Mr. Magyar, Greens' attorney, calculated possible losses confronting Greens while
negotiating to have Rogers pay Greens to take on Rogers' duty to defend is routine and proper.
This does not alter the nature of what happened. Rogers was released from the duty to defend
and bought complete peace, including a hold hannless agreement, by making a payment to
Greens. Lawyers engaged in settlement discussioils use many possible techniques to convince
the other side to offer a sum satisfacto~yto the client. As it turns out, Rogers made a good deal
because, as Greens filings regarding attorney fees and costs show, Greens have spent in legal
fees and costs about three times what Rogers paid to buy peace.
Unconscionability. The trial court correctly analyzed what happened in regard to the
quasi-estoppel claim and correctly found that uncoi~scionabilityhad no application to this
situation. (Amended Memorandum Decision, R Vol. VIII, p. 1644). This is fully supported by
the evidence introduced by Weitz and explains why Green's motion to dismiss this claim at the
close of Weitz's evidence was granted.
The misplaced attempt to use quasi-estoppel did not help the Weitz case. But it did help
to strengthen Tom Rogers' credibility by showing that, at the time of his testimony at trial, he
had no interest in the outcome of the case.

VII. DENIAL OF WEITZ'S MOTION TO AMEND TO ADD A CLAIM FOR ADVERSE
POSSESSION
The grant or denial of leave to amend after a responsive pleading has been filed is
a matter that is within the discretion of the Trial Court and is subject to reversal
on appeal only for an abuse of that discretion. Black Canyon Racquetball Club,
Inc. v. Idaho First National Bank, 119 Idaho 171,175,804 P.2d 900,904 (1991).
In making its decision, the court may consider many things, including but not limited to:
1. Would the opposing party be prejudiced by the delay in adding the new claim?
2. Does the proposed amended Complaint state a valid claim? Does it contain allegations
which if proven would justify the relief sought?
3. Would the added claim be futile? Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First

National Bank, 119 Idaho 171, 804 P.2d 900, (1991). Clark v. Olsen 110 Idaho 323, 715 P.2d

The trial court's decision on Weitz's motion to amend is found in the transcript in two
places because the motion was brought twice. The first time the motion was brought, the court
showed that it understood that it had discretion and should liberally apply it. Tr p. 358, L. 14-22.
The court's ruling on the first motion rested on the grounds of prejudice to Gre'en by loss of the
trial date and the insufficiency of the proposed amended complaint to allege facts which set out a
valid claim. Tr p. 398, L. 1 to p. 399, L. 3.

1. Prejudice. The Court's finding of prejudice is fully supported by the record. At the
time of the motion hearing, almost one and a half years had passed since the filing of Weitz's
complaint.
As set out in I.R.C.P. 65(a)(2), the trial had in effect already begun because a full day

hearing on Green's motion for a preliminary injunction had already taken place, and the
injunction had been granted. The trial date was only two and a half months away and the court
found that it would have to be delayed to the prejudice of Green. Tr p. 398, L. 23 to p. 349, L. 3.
The record supports this finding because on November 15,2004, seven and a half months
before the motion hearing, the court entered a detailed Order setting deadlines to ensure the
orderly progression of the case to trial on September 15, 2005. All the deadlines had passed or
were due in just 4 days. The deadlines were:
I ) March I, 2005 -Plaintiff discloses experts
2) May 2,2005 - Plaintiff discloses lay witnesses
3) June 1,2005 -All potentially dispositive motions served and filed
4) June 1,2005 - Defendants disclose experts
5) June 1,2005 - Defendants disclose lay witnesses.
Note: 4) and 5) had been extended to July 1 on stipulation of the parties back on May 20
to avoid unnecessary cost while settlement was under discussion. R Vol. 11, p. 257.

All of these deadlines would have to be reset and the trial continued if the motion to
amend were granted.

2. Failure to State a Valid Claim. The trial judge found the amended complaint did not
show or allege facts that would set out a valid claim for adverse possession. Tr p. 398, L. 6. The
amendment proposed was short and conclusory. It alleged no additional facts to those already in
the complaint. The amendment proposed read:
Adverse Possession
5 1.

Plaintiffs restate the above allegations as if fully set forth here.

52.

That the plaintiffs or their predecessors in title have hlly and completely
satisfied the statutory requirements of Idaho Code section 5-210 and its
interpretive case law in order to establish title to the Disputed Property by

way of Adverse Possession for the continuous 5-year time period required
by said statute.
Idaho Code

5

5-210 requires either (1) a substantial enclosure surrounding the land

claimed or (2) cultivation or improvement. In addition the claimant must pay taxes on the land.
The proposed amended complaint does not mention taxes. It does not discuss actual
payment or a presumption of payment. No mention is made in the proposed amended complaint
of when the adverse possession was accomplished or by whom. No mention is made of
cultivation or improvement
The proposed amended complaint does not allege a complete enclosure. No mention
whatsoever is made of the western boundary of this property. This is of critical importance
Exhibit 1 was introduced at the preliminary injunction hearing and the judge was familiar
with it at the time of his rejection of the amendment. The portion of Exhibit 1 showing the
northwest comer of Green's property is reproduced below (additional labeling has been added).

The cross-hatched area to the southeast of the center % comer of Section 8 is the western
end of the land claimed by Weitz as described in Exhibit B to the complaint (R Vol. I, p. 30) and
to the proposed amended complaint (R Vol. 11, p. 289).
As the diagram shows, there is no fence at the west end of the land Weitz is claiming. If
Weitz in its amended complaint had chosen to change its claim to include the extra 30 feet to the
fence to the west, then the suit would require Smetana as a necessary party defendant.
Weitz's failure to allege an enclosure is not an oversight. In the proposed amended
complaint Weitz could not allege an enclosure surrounding the land claimed because the
evidence Weitz introduced at the preliminary injunction hearing (Exhibit 1) shows that the land
is not enclosed. Thus the judge's ruling at the first motion hearing that the proposed amended
complaint fails to state "a valid claim" (Tr p. 398, L. 7) is fully supported by the record as it
existed at that time and as it exists today.
3. Futility. As the previously cited cases show, if the requested amendment would allow

a ciaim that has no chance of success, the court can deny the request to amend.
Adverse possession requires proof of exclusive use.
If we treat the entire acreage as one parcel of property, there is no question that
neither J. E. Farmer nor Rice ever used the entire parcel openly, notoriously, and
exclusive of others, since the record indicates that many people used the southern
parcel of the property continuously and without permission. Rice v. Hill City
Stock Yards, Co., 121 Idaho 576,580,826 P.2d 1288, 1292 (1992)
By the time Weitz brought its motion to amend, there had already been8afull day of
testimony. Both Mr. Shook and Mr. Green had testified to their regular recreational use of the
disputed property over the years without any permission from anyone. This was before Green

purchased in July 2002. Tr p. 165, L. 22 (Shook) Tr p. 79, L. 3-12 (Green) The courl lcnew
when it denied the motion to amend that public recreational use was occurring and that Weitz
was not going to be able to show exclusive use.

VIII. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND REMAND
Weitz's request that this Court reverse the trial judge and remand the case to permit the
addition of an adverse possession claim should be denied on the basis of futility. Logic dictates
that if the trial judge can deny on the basis of futility, the appellate court can certainly do so.
There can be no purpose to a remand for trial if the outcome of that trial is certain defeat.
Boundary by agreement and adverse possession do not necessarily have the same
elements of proof. However, because of the facts of the case at bar, some of the required
elements of an adverse possession claim have already been litigated between these parties and
decided by the trial court in reaching its decision on the claims before it. These are Greens' BFP
status, non-exclusive use, and absence of a substantial enclosure.

BFP status of Green. As already demonstrated in this brief, the trial court found and the
record supports that Todd and Tonia Green purchased their land without actual or constructive
notice of any claim of ownership by Weitz. This would be just as fatal to an adverse possession
claim as it was to the boundary by agreement claim.
Weitz's brief cites cases from other jurisdictions to argue for the proposition that actual
or constructive notice is not required with regard to an adverse possession claim. But these cases
have no precedential value because the statutory schemes of these jurisdictions are very different
from the one in Idaho.

Weitz cites the Arizona case of Ovevson v. Cowley, 664 P.2d 210 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982)
Arizona Revised Statutes, Sections 12-526 and 12-527 read:
12-526 Real property in adverse possession and use by possessor; ten year limitation;
limit of area; fixing of boundaries under duly recorded memorandum of title.
Article 2 Real Actions
A. A person who has a cause of action for recovery of any lands, tenements or
hereditaments from a person having peaceable and adverse possession thereof,
cultivating, using and enjoying such property, shall commence an action therefor
within ten years after the cause of action accrues, and not afterward.
12-527 Effect of limitation on title
Article 2 Real Actions
When an action for recovery of real property is barred by any provision of this
article, the person who pleads and is entitled to the bar shall be held to have full title
precluding all claims.
This bars the world from bringing an action to challenge the adverse possession after it
has continued for 10 years. Some courts faced with this type of statute have ruled that the statute
of limitations would be defeated if a BFP could bring suit after the 10 years had passed.
The 1949 Washington decision cited by Weitz, Mugaas v. Smith, 33 Wn.2d 429,206 P.2d
332, results Erom a statutory scheme similar to Arizona's. In Mugaas, the Court noted that while
it might be useful to alter the statutory scheme, the Court did not have this power. It is not clear
what the Washington Court would rule today. However, in a 1992 case the Washington
Supreme Court, sitting en banc, said:
The land law has seen its years of progress marked by a continual struggle
between one who had legal title to, or an equity or interest in or claim against real
estate and one who in good faith parts with consideration in the honest belief that

he is acquiring title from another. The law has long recognized that the massive
public policy in favor of stimulation of commerce demands the fullest possible
protection to a good faith purchaser for value. The bona fide purchaser for
value without notice is the favored creature of the law. Tomlinson K Clarke,
118 Wn.2d 498, 508, 825 P.2d 706, 71 1, 712. (emphasis added)
Idaho statutes are very different from those in Arizona and Washington. Idaho long ago
adopted the Tomlinson position and strongly favors the BFP. LC.§ 5-206 reads:
CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION. In every action for the recovery of real
property, or the possession thereof, a person establishing a legal title to the
property is presumed to have been possessed thereof within the time required by
law, and the occupation of the property by another person is deemed to have been
under and in subordination to the legal title, unless it appears that the property has
been held and possessed adversely to such legal title, for twenty (20) years before
the commencement of the action. [statute read five (5) years at the time of trial]
This coupled with I.C.

$3 5-203 and 5-210 create an entirely different statutory scheme

and lead to the longstanding interpretation favoring the BFP as set out in Langroise v. Becker, 96
Idaho 218,526 P.2d 178, 180 (1974 Sup Ct) at page 220, (see pages 5 and 6 above).
Exclusive use. With respect to Weitz's prescriptive easement claim, the trial court found
that numerous individuals, unconnected with the Weitz family, used the trail on the disputed
property. This lack of exclusive use was fatal to the prescriptive easement claim and would be
just as fatal to an adverse possession claim. See Rice v. Hill City Stock Yards, Co., 121 Idaho

Enclosure. Paragraph 21 of the complaint filed by Weitz claimed that the east side of the
disputed property was enclosed by a fence extending south to the alleged boundary fence. In
ruling in favor of Green's slander of title claim, the court found this statement to be false. The
fact that the eastern boundary was not enclosed was supported by the testimony of Steven Shook

who said the eastern fence stopped at least 60 feet short of the alleged boundary fence. Tr p.
1493, L. 17 to p. 1494, L. 10. The court's finding is also supported by the admission of Gerald
Weitz that the fence was not completed. This admission was introduced at trial by placing a
portion of Gerald Weitz's deposition in evidence. This portion of the deposition is found in the
.

.

ADDENDUM TO TIiE CLERK'S RECORD attached as Exhibit D to the ORDER SETTING
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL, at p. 3 L. 6 to p. 4 L. 5.
The fact that the east end of the disputed property was not completely enclosed would be fatal to
a claim of adverse' possession.
If this case were remanded to permit Weitz to file an adverse possession claim, the claim
would fail on a motion for sumnary judgment, raising collateral estoppel based on the three
preceding issues that have already been litigated and decided between the parties. See Maroun v.

Wyreless Systems, Znc., 141 Idaho 604, 617, 618, 114 P.3d 974, 987, 988 (Sup Ct 2005). If
Weitz's amended complaint were truthful, the claim of adverse possession would fail on a
motion to dismiss.

TAXES
The trial court did not rule on the tax issue, but the record is clear that Weitz will fail on
this issue. Weitz does not dispute that it never paid taxes on the claimed eight and one-half acres.
They raise the "lot number exception" and quote two paragraphs from an affidavit from Steve
Fiscus.
At the time of making the affidavit, Mr. Fiscus was no longer employed in the Latah
County Assessors office and resided in Boise, Idaho where he did not have access to all of the

Assessor's records. Further, his affidavit does not state that he was informed that the Weitz
claim was for more than 8 acres. In short there is nothing to indicate that Mr. Fiscus was made
aware of the full factual situation in the case. He may very well have thought that the fence he
hypothesized was straight and only a few feet from the true boundary line.
This Court recently stated in Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264, 127 P.3d 167 (2005):
When determining whether an exception to the tax payment requirement applies,
the basis for the assessor's actual valuation of the property, whether by metes and
bounds or some other more general method, is critically important. Id. at 530,
(citing Trappett, 102 Idaho at 53 1, 633 P.2d at 595. "The general tax mle focuses
on actual payment as evidenced by the assessor's actual valuation." Id. Unless the
land was assessed under a metes and bounds description, or there is evidence the
adverse possessor did not pay any taxes on the property, the law presumes the
adverse possessor paid taxes on the disputed parcel and the tax payment
requirement is satisfied. (142 Idaho at 272, 127 P.3d at 175)
The actual method used by the Assessor in the Weitz v. Green case appears in the Clerk's
Record in the form of an affidavit from Susan Ripley, the appraisal supervisor for Latah County.
R Vol. IV, p. 967 to p. 971. As Ms. Ripley explains, the assessor's office uses and resorts to
aerial photographs upon which the office marks information and keeps these photographs as
business records. These aerial photographs were not made available to Mr. Fiscus. Making use
of all the available records, Susan Ripley stated unequivocally that the Weitz property was
assessed to the quarter section line and not to a fence south of the line. Thus Green's
predecessors in interest have always paid the taxes on the land in question and Weitz never has.
This may explain why Weitz's first attorney never brought an adverse possession claim
and may explain why the proposed amended complaint made no mention of taxes. Since this
affidavit was provided to the judge at the second hearing on the motion to amend, it certainly

means there was yet another insurmountable barrier to an adverse possession claim and provides
additional support to the court's second denial of Weitz' request to amend.

IX. SLANDER OF TITLE
At this point it is useful to review how the case proceeded. When the trial testimony
ended, a short colloquy took place between court and counsel. Tr p. 1859, L. 23 to p. 1860, L
20. Mr. Brown for Weitz declined to make closing argument. As Mr. Schwam rose to make his
closing argument with regard to Green's claims, the court quickly said, "Thank you, we're
adjourned". Mr. Schwam stayed standing to begin his closing and in the few additional
sentences spoken by the court and Mr. Schwam, the judge made it clear that it was
"unnecessary" for Mr. Schwam to close on behalf of Green.
Lawyers have different styles for doing trials. Both of Green's lawyers prefer to avoid
argument and grandstanding during trial. Rather, they prefer to assemble the facts and related
law in a closing argument. Thus the court took Green's claims under advisement without a clear
picture of the way the trial evidence interplayed with statements made in the complaint and with
the law to justify Green's claims.
The court rendered its first memorandum decision denying all of Weitz' claims and most
of Green's. Green filed a motion for reconsideration, a memorandum in support of the motion,
and set the motion for hearing. It was at this motion hearing that the court heard what in effect
was Mr. Schwam's closing on behalf of Green's claims. See Tr p. 1883, L. 1 to p. 1933, L. 4.
Following the motion hearing the court rendered an AMENDED MEMORANDUM
DECISION which states on page I .

This Amended Memorandum Decision supersedes and replaces this Court's
Memorandum Decision which was filed January 9, 2006. This decision takes into
account and is in response to DefendantsICounter-Plaintiffs' Motion to Clarify,
Correct and Reconsider and Plaintiffs' response to that motion.
There is only one decision in this case. That is the final one rendered on June 28,2006 and
found in the clerk's record at Vol. VIII, p. 1636.
Why Weitz quotes from a decision which has been superseded and replaced is unclear. That
Weitz does this without clearly stating that the quote is from a document that has become a nullity
seems questionable and improper. At minimum it can badly mislead a reader of the Weitz brief.
Such a quote appears at page 44 of the Weitz brief in support of the attack on the court's
finding that Weitz slandered Green's title. Once the court had the benefit of a thorough assemblage
of Green's case, the court completely removed the finding quoted by Weitz from its final decision.
It replaced this with a finding that Weitz "was reckless in its challenge to Green's title". The court
then cited the false statement in paragraph 21 of the complaint as an example and then found Weitz
reckless in making the assertion. R Vol. VI, p. 1647. The court had a number of such examples to
choose from and they will be listed shortly.

Weaver v. Stafford, 134 Idaho 691, 701, 8 P.3d 1234, 1244 (2000) explains the law and
application of the doctrine of slander of title and is right on point with our case.
A cause of action for slander of title requires Owyhee Village to establish the
following: (1) uttering or publishing of slanderous statements; (2) when the
statements were false; (3) with malice; and (4) resulting in special damages. See
Matheson v. Harris, 98 Idaho 758, 760-61, 572 P.2d 861, 863-64 (1977). Here,
Stafford's pleadings assert an interest in Lot 16 and thus satisfy the publication
element of slander of title. Stafford's repeated assertion of an interest in Lot 16 was
clearly false in light of the deed which set the boundary between Lot 16 and the
Stafford property and Stafford's destruction of the original dirt ditch which

corresponded to the boundary. Moreover, Stafford admitted that he excavated the
new ditch on Lot 16 without Weaver's permission. Malice has been generally
defined by Idaho courts as a reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of a
statement. See Bandelin v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho 337, 342, 563 P.2d 395, 400 (1977).
An action will not lie where a statement in slander of title, although false, was
made in good faith with probable cause for believing it. Stafford argues he believed
the original fence was the boundary between Lot 16 and the Stafford property.
Upon removing the original fence, however, Stafford did not make a good faith
effort to record the location of the original fence or to place the new fence or new
ditch where the original fence had been. Stafford admitted the new fence was where
the original fence had been only in places. Stafford's conduct in erecting the new
fence and excavating the new ditch on Lot 16 thus belie any good faith belief in his
ownership interest in Lot 16. Finally, Owyhee Village has incurred special damages
in the form of Weaver's refusal to tender payment and the legal expenses incurred
in defending Stafford's claims. We therefore hold the district judge's slander of title
determination is supported by substantial and competent evidence.
On April 12, 2005, Mrs. Weitz filed an affidavit with the court swearing that the
statements in the complaint were true. R Vol. I, p. 170, paragraph 3
Road. The Weitz complaint at paragraphs 14 and 15 reads as follows.

14. By 1967, a road had been constructed by Schoepflins within the Disputed
Property and north of the fence and fenceline running easterly and westerly for the
entire length of the Disputed Property (the "road").
15. The road has been continuously used and maintained by the Plaintiffs and
Schoepflins since 1967 for hunting, hiking, motorcycling, snowmobiling, logging
and vehicular access to areas within Plaintiffs' property and the Disputed Property.
R Vol. I, p. 20-21.
Weitz knew that the road had not been continuously used and maintained. Weitz had to
know that these two paragraphs gave a false picture and that this mattered to the case. Gerald
Weitz admitted that there had been no work on the road after 1994 until October 2002, after
Green purchased and surveyed. Tr p. 288,.L. 23 to p. 289, L. 2.
The court made findings regarding this alleged "continuously used and maintained" road

in two places in its decision. These findings read as follows:
Following the purchase of the property, the Greens hired Ron Monson, a land
surveyor, to subdivide their property. Mr. Monson began his work in August 2002.
In the process of surveying, he hung surveyor's tape on the property demonstrating
that he was in the process of surveying the property. As an apparent result of the
surveyor's actions, the Weitz family sprang into action. Ed Weitz, a nephew of
Gerald Weitz, went up and cut out the log that had fallen across the trail, thereby
enabling motorized travel the length of the trail without detour. Gerald Weitz, the
Weitz family patriarch, took his Caterpillar tractor to the property and on at least two
different instances bladed the trail in such a way as to convert it from an overgrown
trail to one which would allow a four-wheel-drive pickup truck to travel from one
end to the other. R Voi. VIII, p. 1638.
While it may be true that the trail in question appears in the Weitz family's exhibits
to be part of a "seamless web" of roads on the Weitz family's property, it did not
appear to be so at the time the Greens bought the disputed property. In 2002, when
the Greens purchased the property, the trail looked like a footpath or a trail for a
motorcycle or a four-wheel, all-terrain vehicle (except where the log had fallen
across the pathway and necessitated passage by some other means). Prior to the
Greens' purchase, the trail had been most recently bladed by Mrs. Weitz's father
around 1994. For the eight years prior to the Greens' purchase, the trail had fallen
into disuse. It did not appear, on the ground, to be part of a seamless web of
roadways extending onto the Weitz family's property. R Vol. VIII, p. 1641.
Thus the court found that after altering the facts on the ground, Weitz made a false statement
designed to strengthen its claim and overcome Green's true status as a BFP without notice.
Alleged fence. The Weitz complaint at paragraphs 10 and 23 reads as follows.
10. A fence and fenceline were constructed no later than 1929 and have existed in
the same place since that time in the vicinity and running easterly and westerly
over the entire length of the quarter-section line between the NE '/4 and SE '/4 of
said Section 8 (the "fence and fenceline"). R Vol. I, p. 19.
23. On information and belief, some Defendants or their agents, at some time
during the month of July, 2003, damaged a significant portion of the fence and
fenceline by cutting the fence wire approximately every twenty feet of its length,
by destroying some fence posts, and by destroying rock piles that helped stabilize
some of the fence posts. R Vol. I, p. 22-23.

Taken together these paragraphs assert that a fence really existed until defendants tore it
down. Of course at trial the court learned that this was false and that Weitz knew it all along.
Mrs. Weitz admitted that the original fence was not maintained after 1972 and had just fallen
into the ground from lack of maintenance. Tr p. 256, L. 7-1 1
After Green bought t l ~ eproperty, Mrs. Weitz hired Dana Townsend to build another
fence where the old one used to be. Tr p. 801, L. 23 - p. 802, L. 6. Mrs. Weitz knew that it was
this new fence that had been removed because she knew the original fence had already just fallen
into the ground. Further, Mr. Townsend testified that it was he who created the rock gabions
(piles). Tr p. 822, L. 9 - p. 823, L. 17. The complaint falsely states that the original fence had
rock piles (gabions) and that these were destroyed by defendants or their agents.
After extensive panying, Mrs. Weitz finally admitted that she,was aware that the
condition of the "fence" mattered to her case. Tr p. 1345, L. 10 to p. 1347, L. 25. Knowing that
the "fence" was down and knowing that its condition mattered to her case, Consuelo Weitz hired
Dana Townsend to build a new one. Then Weitz filed a complaint, later verified by an affidavit,
that stated essentially that a fence existed until July 2003 when defendants or their agents tore it
down. These were recklessly false statements designed to strengthen Weitz's claim.
Eastern "boundary" fence. The Weitz complaint at paragraph 21 states:

2 1. In 1994, Weitzes installed a blue gate on the eastern boundary of Plaintiffs'
property and a connecting hogwire fence that extended southerly along the eastern
boundary of the Disputed Property to its intersection with the fence and fenceline
to keep intruders from trespassing on the NE !4 of said Section 8 and the Disputed
Property. The Rogers never disputed the Weitzes' installation of the hogwire
fence along the eastern boundary ofthe Disputed Property. R Vol. I, p. 22.

Witnesses testified that the hogwire fence did not reach an intersection with the alleged
fence. The most important witness was Gerald Weitz himself when a portion of his deposition
testimony was accepted in evidence and read by the court as a deposition of a party opponent.
The court minutes record this. R Vol. VI, p. 1289. The deposition portion p. 10, L. 23 through
p. 12, L. 5 is reproduced in the addendum to the record as an attachment to the Order Settling
Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript on Appeal. Gerald Weitz admits that the hogwire
fence stops short of the alleged boundary fence because "We ran out of wire". This was the
example the court chose to use in rendering its decision that Weitz slandered Green's title. The
court said:
The final issue remaining for decision is the claim by the Castles, Greens and
Shooks that the title to their property has been slandered by the Weitz family. There
are four essential elements to a slander of title action. These include: "(1) The
uttering and publication of the slanderous words by the defendant [sic]; (2) the
falsity of the words; (3) malice, and (4) special damages . . . ." Matheson v. Harris,
98 Idaho 758, 759, 572 P.2d 861, 862 (1977). I1 appears that the Weitz family
slandered the Greens' title by making the assertions they did in their complaint.
The real questions presented are whether the actions of the Weitz family were
malicious and whether the Greens can show special damages. "Malice has been
generally defined by Idaho courts as a reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of
a statement." Weaver v. Stafford, 134 Idaho 691, 701, 8 P.3d 1234 1244 (2000).
As to this component, it appears that the Weitz family was reckless in its
challenge to the Greens' title. As an example, the complaint alleges that the
hogwire fence on the eastern portion of the disputed property "extended southerly
along the eastern boundary of the Disputed Property to its intersection with the
fence and fenceline to keep intruders from trespassing on the NE % of said
Section 8 and the Disputed Property." Complaint at 7 21. This statement is false.
Further, it was reckless of the Weitz family to make this assertion. Consequently,
malice has been established. The final remaining question is whether the Greens
can establish special damages. If they can, then all of the elements of a slander of
title claim will have been proven. A review of the case law indicates that
attorney's fees constitute "special damages" for purposes of creating aprima facie
case of slander of title. See Ray1 v. Shull Enterprises Inc., 108 Idaho 524, 530,

700 P.2d 567, 573 (1984). Consequently, the Castles, Greens and Shooks have
proven the Weitz family slandered their title. R Vol. VIII, p. 1646-1647.
(emphasis added)
The court uses the word "assertions" above. The plural is fully justified and supported by
the record and testimony, as the foregoing discussion has shown. The Weitz complaint contains
material assertions that Weitz knew were false. The finding of recklessness is supported by a
record which shows a bad faith attempt to create a complaint supported by material
misrepresentations which prevented the disposal of the claims at the start of the proceedings.
If the complaint had stated truthfully that the fence was down over its length at the time
of Greens' purchase, the boundary by agreement claim would have failed on a motion to dismiss.
If the complaint had stated truthfully that the alleged road was just a trail and that there was no
meeting of fences on the east end that would keep people out, there would have been no basis to
keep trying to amend to .add an adverse possession claim. Further, the prescriptive easement
claim would have succumbed to either a motion to dismiss or, if necessary, a motion for
summary judgment on a simple showing of public use. Instead Greens have had to expend and
continue to have to expend substantial sums on attorney fees to defend against a hopeless claim.

X. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE APPLIED I.C. 3 6-202. ACTIONS FOR TRESPASS.
The facts of our case are uncontroverted and come from the testimony of Consuelo Weitz
and her first attorney, Mr. Landeck. During cross-examination Consuelo Weitz admitted that she
received Exhibit WW from her attorney and that she read it, all within a reasonable time after the
date of the letter. Tr p. 1343, L.14 - p. 1344 L. 20. This receipt and reading would be about six
months before the trees were cut down.

Exhibit WW is the letter sent by attorney Magyar to attorney Landeck on December 16,
2002 and states in pertinent part:
On behalf of Todd and Tonia Green, I am informing you and your clients that
your clients are trespassing upon property owned by Todd and Tonia Green. The
Greens demand that such trespassing cease and desist immediately. My clients
intend to hold your clients responsible for any and all damages to the disputed
property. Exhibit WW, p. 2.
After confirming her knowledge of the letter, Exhibit WW, Consuelo Weitz went on to
testify as follows:
[By Mr. Schwam] Did you understand from that paragraph that you should stop
doing anything to this property that might harm it?
A. Because of my history with this land and because of four generations of using
this land and through discussions with my attorney which happened before July
3 1, 2003, it was my understanding that we would continue to treat the land as we
had over the past almost 30 years that I had lived there personally and since my
family acquired the land in 1929. And that was my understanding of what was
appropriate until it could be determined whose land it was.
Q. So, I gather you made a decision to go on treating the land as you always had?
A. Basically.
Q. And that decision was to treat it as if it was yours?
A. That's correct.
Tr p. 1349, L. 11 top. 1350, L. 3.
I.C. 9 6-202 reads in pertinent part.
6-202. ACTIONS FOR TRElSPASS. Any person who, without permission of the
owner, or the owner's agent ... cuts down or carries off any wood or underwood,
tree or timber, or girdles, or otherwise injures any tree or timber on the land of
another person ... without lawful authority, is liable to the owner of such land ...
for treble the amount of damages which may be assessed therefore or fifty dollars
($50.00), plus a reasonable attorney's fee which shall be taxed as costs, in any
civil action brought to enforce the terms of this act if the plaintiff prevails.
The courts of Idaho have added an additional requirement for this statute to apply.

While the statute does not so state in terms, it is clear, we think, that it was not
intended to apply to cases in which the trespass was committed through an
innocent mistake as to the boundary or location of a tract of land claimed by
the defendant. Similar statutes of other states have received this construction, and
we are satisfied it is correct. Menasha Woodenware Co. v. Spokane Int'l Railway
Co., 19 Idaho 586,593, 115 P. 22,24 (191 1) (emphasis added)
Later Idaho cases adopted the phrase "willfully and intentionally". Earl v. Fordice 84
Idaho 542,544,545, 374 P.2d 713,714 (1962),
Black's Law Dictionary defines willful as voluntary and intentional, but not necessarily
malicious. Webster's Unabridged Dictionary defines willful with two meanings: (1) deliberate,
voluntary, or intentional; and (2) unreasonably stubborn or headstrong; self-willed.
It is clear that in Menasha the Court wanted to eliminate treble damages when an
"innocent mistake" occurred. Green accepts that the later cases are using a definition of
"willful" which includes more than just intent. These cases must be looking for an "unreasonable
stubbornness or headstrong" behavior. None of the cases on this subject require maliciousness
or intentional criminal action such as theft.
Green does not take exception to the trial court's fact finding in regard to this issue, but
only to the court's ultimate legal conclusion. The trial court rendered a mixture of legal and
factual findings when it stated:
It appears clear that Mrs. Weitz was never advised that the problem had gone away.
Nevertheless, Mrs. Weitz became unreasonably optimistic when advised by her
counsel that the dispute might go away. She, and her arborist, pressed ahead. In
order to be subject to trebling of damages, the actions of Mr. and Mrs. Weitz must
be willful and intentional, not "merely negligent." Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124
Idaho 629, 639, 862 P.2d 321, 331 (Ct. App. 1993). The facts establish that Mr.
and Mrs. Weitz in pressing ahead were unreasonable. However, the evidence fails
to establish that the timber trespass attributable to Mr. and Mrs. Weitz through the

actions of Mr. Townsend was willful and intentional. When Mr. and Mrs. Weitz
hired Mr. Townsend, they unreasonably thought that the property dispute might
have been resolved by the Greens' settlement with the Rogers' Family Trust. They
were negligent in moving ahead, but their negligence does not arise to an intentional
and willful act. Consequently, the trespass engaged in by Mr. Townsend is not
subject to trebling. R Vol. VIII, p. 1646. (emphasis added)
The court misapplies the concept of negligence without realizing it. Negligence relates to
unintended actions or unintended outcomes. Negligence is a lack of carefulness, not intentional acts
arising from an unreasonable state of mind.
Intentional acts which arise from an unreasonable state of mind precisely meet the definition
of willful. The trial court found that Mrs. Weitz's "unreasonably optimistic" men!al state excused
her behavior, when, in fact, it was the cause of her willfulness.
Unreasonable optimism, oRen called overconfidence, is what causes willful or headstrong
behavior. The trial court seems to have confused its finding of an unreasonable state of mind with
the concept of "the reasonable man standard" used in determining whether negligence has occurred.
In this confusion the trial court mistakenly ruled that the cause of willful behavior is a defense to it.
The requirement of "willful and intentional" seeks to avoid punishing innocent or
reasonable behavior. If "willii and intentional" does not include behavior resulting from an
unreasonable mindset, all that will be left is malicious or criminal. This would limit "willful" to
exactly what willful does not mean.
This author does have some sympathy for the trial court's confusion in reading Bumgarner
v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629, 862 P.2d 321 (Ct. App. 1993). Bumgarner presented a confusing
set of facts. In Bumgarner the trial court found that a portion of the tree cutting took place on land

about which the ownership was unclear due to a true ambiguity in the deeds. Since this ambiguity
was only resolved by the trial court's decision, the trial court found that the trespasser had an
innocent state of mind with regard to just this portion of the property so his actions were not willful.
As to the remainder of the property, the trespasser's actions were found intentional and willful.
Our case is entirely different. Mrs. Weitz was well aware that the land involved was not
within the description of her deed, and she had been told to stay off it. Then, based upon a selfserving interpretation of events, she developed what the trial judge found to be an unreasonable state
of mind. Then, as the trial judge found, she unreasonably pressed ahead in a course of action that
cut down 240 trees on properly she did not own.
Thus the trial court's findings of fact that Mrs. Weitz was "unreasonably optimistic" and
that she unreasonably pressed ahead required a finding that her behavior was intentional and willful
and that I.C. 5 6-202 applies.

XI. MEASURE OF DAMAGES
The trial court made a legal error with regard to the measure of damages it applied. The
judge looked to the "market value" of the trees cut but took too narrow a view of this phrase. The
trial judge also failed to consider the well established law that in trespass the legally required
measure of damages is the cost of restoring the land to the condition it was in before the trespass.
That is that these trees have to be replanted. The trial court noted the rule it was applying.
"In an action for timber trespass, the measure of actual damages is based upon the
amount of the trees taken and the market value of the trees in that area at the time of
the taking." Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629,640,862 P.2d 321,332 (Ct.
App. 1993). While the trees cut were not marketable in the sense that they could be
milled and cut into dimension lumber (with the exception of one tree), they

nevertheless had some market value. The Court concludes that the Castles, Greens
and Shooks should each receive $500.00 for the market value of the timber trespass
by Mr. Townsend at the request of Mr. and Mrs. Weitz. R Vol. VIII, p. 1645.
In Bumgarner, 124 Idaho at page 641, 862 P.2d at 333, the Court of Appeals upheld the
very measure of damages that Green requests in this case. That is, replacement cost.
Gary also takes issue with the court's valuation of the trees. Specifically, he
argues that the court erred in valuing the trees based upon evidence of the cost of
repurchasing them on the open market. He suggests that the court instead should
have calculated the value of the trees based upon the price Kent would have
received had he sold them "on site." It is well established, however, that the cost
of replacement is evidence of an item's "market value." See Spanbauer v. J.R.
Simplot Co., 107 Idaho 42, 46, 685 P.2d 271, 275 (1984). Finding no error, we
uphold the district court's decision concerning the valuation of trees removed.
Although the Court of Appeals speaks in terms of market value, the result is that the
plaintiff received compensation to repurchase the trees cut and thus restore the land. The Court
of Appeals correctly explained its Bumgarner decision in the 1997 Sellers case when it said,
In an action for injury to land, where the injury is temporary, the owner is entitled
to recover the amount necessary to repair the injury and put the land in the
condition it was at the time immediately preceding the injury. Bumgarner, 124
Idaho at 639,862 P.2d at 33 1. The proper measure for the value of the trees which
were removed from the property was the market value cost of replacement. Id at
641, 862 P.2d at 333. Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 128,937 P.2d 434,440.
The law regarding restoration after trespass is well established. Raide v. Dollar, 34 Idaho
682,688,203 P. 469,471 (1921), approved a jury instruction which read in pertinent part:
"And you are further instructed that if from the preponderance of the evidence
you believe that defendant did so enter plaintiffs land without his consent and
contrary to his wishes with said teams and logging devices ... by reason of which
plaintiffs said lands, premises and meadow were injured and damaged, you
should find in favor of plaintiff and assess his damages against defendant in such
sum as it would necessarily cost to repair such injury, if any has been proven.
(emphasis added)

This rule was recently affirmed in Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District V. Mussell, 139 Idaho
28,72 P.3d 868 (2003). Numerous jurisdictions are in accord with the Idaho rule and express the
application of it and the reasons for it clearly. The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin has said:
Because recovery in trespass is based on a wrongful invasion of a plaintiffs
rights, the rule of damages adopted should more carefully guard against failure to
compensate the injured party than against possible overcharge to the wrongdoer.
Gilman v. Brown, 115 Wis. l,7,91 N.W. 227,229 (1902). In Gilman the supreme
court said:

An owner of real estate has a right to enjoy it according to his own taste and
wishes, and the arrangement of buildings, shade trees, fruit trees, and the like may
be very important to him ... and the modification thereof may be an injury to his
convenience and comfort in the use of his premises which fairly ought to be
substantially compensated, and yet the arrangement so selected by him ... might
not meet the taste of others, and the disturbance of that arrangement, therefore,
might not impair the general market value. While the owner may be deprived of
something valuable to him, ... yet he might be wholly unable to prove any ...
depreciation of the market value of the land. The owner ofproperty has a right to
hold it for his own use ... and ... he should be compensated for an injury
wrongfully done him in that respect, although that injury might be unappreciable
to one holding the same premises for purposes of sale. [41] Id. at 7-8, 91 N.W. at
229 (emphasis added). Threlfall V. Town Muscoda, 527 N.W.2d 367, 12/08/94;
1994.W1.15400,527 N.W.2d 367, 190 Wis. 2d 121 at 133, 134.
Later in the same case the court said:
Application of a restoration rule is appropriate here because the diminishedmarket-value rule would leave the plaintiffs without a remedy for the Town's
damage to their use of their property. To leave them without a remedy "would be
to decide that by the wrongful act of another, [they] may be compelled to accept a
change in the physical condition of [their] property, or else perform the work of
restoration at [their] own expense." See Heninger v. Dunn, 162 Cal. Rptr. 104,
108 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). Id. at 136.
In Heninger v. Dunn the court gave a thorough analysis at pages 864 and 865.
The "personal reason" exception has been invoked in many jurisdictions in cases
involving destruction of shade or ornamental trees that were of personal value to

the owner. In recent years, "courts throughout the country have placed a greater
emphasis on the rights of a property owner to enjoy the aesthetic value of trees
and shrubbery, notwithstanding the fact they may have little commercial value or
that their destruction may, indeed, even enhance the market value of the
property." (Rector, etc. v. C. S. McCrossan (1975) 306 Minn. 143, 146 [235
N.W.2d 609, 6101.) Where such trees or shrubbery are destroyed by a trespasser,
"[sound] principle and persuasive authority support the allowance to an aggrieved
landowner of the fair cost of restoring his land to a reasonable approximation of
its former condition, without necessary limitation to the diminution in the market
value of the land . . . ." (Huber v. Serpico (1962) 71 N.J. Super. 329, 345 [I76
A.2d 805, 8131. Accord, Ragland v. Clarson (Fla.App. 1972) 259 So.2d 757,759;
Roark v. Musgrave (1976) 41 Ill. App.3d 1008, 1013 1355 N.E.2d 91, 951;
Samson Construction Co. v. Brusowankin (1958) 218 Md. 458, 466-467 [I47
A.2d 430, 435-436; 69 A.L.R.2d 1326, 13321; Rector, etc. v. C. S. McCrossan,
supra, 306 Minn. at p. 146 [235 N.W.2d at p. 6101; Morris v. Ciborowski (1973)
113 N.H. 563, 566 [311 A.2d 296, 299, 79 A.L.R.3d 2481 Thatcher v. Lane
Construction Co. (1970) [23] 21 Ohio App.2d 41, 49 [254 N.E.2d 703, 7081;
Pehrson v. Saderup (1972) 28 Utah2d 77, 79 [498 P.2d 648, 6501.) If restoration
of the land to a reasonable approximation of its former condition is impossible or
impracticable, the landowner may recover the value of the trees or shrubbery,
either as timber or for their aesthetic qualities, again without regard to the
diminution in the value of the land. (Samson Construction Co. v. Brusowankin,
supra, 218 Md. at pp. 466-467 [I47 A.2d at p. 4351. See also Turner v. Southern
Excavation, Inc. (La.App. 1975) 322 So.2d 326, 329.) The overall principles by
which the courts are to be guided are "flexibility of approach and full
compensation to the owner, within the overall limitation of reasonableness."
(Huber v. Serpico, supra, 71 N.J. Super. at p. 346 [I76 A.2d at p. 8131.) Heninger
v. Dunn, 101 Cal.App.3d 858, 162 Cal.Rptr. 104 (Cal.App.Dist.1 02/05/1980)
Also in accord is Sherrell v. Selfors 73 Wn. App. 596, 871 P.2d 168 (1994). This case
also awarded treble damages on facts weaker than our case.
The damages to Green, Shook and Castle fall squarely within the above described rule.
Exhibit DD, admitted in evidence, is a copy of the "Declaration of Protective Covenants,
Conditions, and Restrictions, Greens' Addition".

These were recorded in Latah County in

December, 2002, more than six months before Weitz cut the 240 trees. The relevant part of this

Declaration is found in Section V,

v
Timber and Logging
To preserve the local environment, no more than 10% of the total trees over 12inch butt shall be removed from any one parcel. This is for the clearing necessary
for the residential view and fire buffer zone.
All logging material shall be burned or removed from the site. All stumps shall
be removed or cut flush to ground level.
Once the home is constructed only dead or fallen trees over 12-inch butt may be
removed from the property.
The harvesting of any timber solely for commercial gain is prohibited.
Trees of less than 12-inch butt may be removed in order to promote the healthy
growth of timber (thinning), to maintain a buffer for fire safety purposes or to
preserve the view.

Retention of the existing forest is of vital importance to maintaining
the natural environment of the area and is viewed as a primary objective of
these Restrictive Covenants. (emphasis added)
This is unique evidence because there can be no conjecture regarding the purpose of these
240 cut trees to the three victims of the trespass. Weitz was effectively put on notice that the
victims considered retention of the existing forest to be of vital importance. Weitz held a
different view and wanted to log this l a d . However, less than two weeks before Weitz cut the
trees, Mr. Landeck (Weitz's attorney at the time) told Consuelo Weitz not to log.
And, as to the logging plan, she indicated that they had a desire to log in the area, and I
believe that I advised her to -that they ought not to log within the disputed area, that that
should be off limits for, while this - as this -until this matter was resolved. [Deposition
of attorney Ronald Landeck page 28, L. 19 - 24. The deposition was placed in the
record in lieu of live testimony by stipulation of the parties.]
The trial judge has incorrectly applied the mental view held by the trespasser instead of
the view held by the victims. This creates an anomalous result.

Let us suppose that one of the landowners, say Shook, had chosen to cut down the same
trees Weitz cut on Shook's property. The other two landowners, Green and Castle, enforcing the
foregoing covenants, would have been able to require Shook to restore his land to be in
conformance with the covenants. The trial courts' misapplication of the law has permitted the
trespasser, Weitz, to do at trivial cost, what the landowner (victim) is forbidden to do.
These trees had a special purpose and restoration should be the measure of damages.
It is worthwhile noting that the Green, Shook, and Castle parcels together totaled almost
116 acres with a value without structures of about $600,000 as testified to by the owners at trial.

An alternative method of valuation would be to use the average per acre rate of reimbursement
set out in the Shook and Castle sales contracts for any land lost to Weitz. This would yield a
value in excess of $500,000.00 for the 116 acres.
Exhibit TT and the testimony of Green's expert put the total restoration cost at
$66,240.01 for the 240 trees. This is a reasonable sum given the full value of the land.
The case should be remanded for the trial court to award the correct damages based on
the cost to replace the trees and restore the land.

XII. ATTORNEY PEES ON APPEAL
In a recent boundary by agreement claim case in which the plaintiff failed at trial and
then appealed, respondent was awarded attorney fees because the appellant had simply invited
the appellate court to second guess the trial judge's fact finding on conflicting evidence. Downey
v. Vavold, 166 P.3d 382; (ID 2007). This is all Weitz has done and attorney fees should be
awarded to Green. Further, attorney fees should be awarded on appeal because they constitute

special damages in Green's successful slander of title claim. Finally, if this court finds that
Idaho Code

5

6-202. Actions for Trespass. is applicable, then attorney fees are also justified

pursuant to that statute.

CONCLUSION
The trial court should be affirmed with regard to all of Weitz's claims and the Green,
Shook, and Castle slander of title claim. The trial court's finding of trespass by Weitz should be
amplified to include a violatioil of LC.
award of attorney fees under I.C.

5

6-202 and remanded to the trial court to consider an

5 6-202. There should also be a remand to assess damages in

conformance with the law of replacement and restoration. Attorney fees and costs should be
awarded to Greens on appeal.
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Final Decision by Judge Stegner

AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION
Issued June 28,2006

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL D I S T s 3 @ 5 8

p~ 4: g1

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF L % W FDIST,31C~C O U ~ ~
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO J. WEITZ,
husband and wife, and WETZ & SONS, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company,

)
)
)

Plaintiffs,

~~--

Case No. CV-04-00080

AMENDED1
MEMORANDUM DECISION2

VS.

)

TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN,
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK and
MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, DANIAL T.
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. CASTLE,
and U.S. BANK, N.A.,
Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs.
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TODD A. GREEN and TOMA L. GREEN,
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK and
MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, DANLAL T.
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. CASTLE,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)

1
1
)
)
)
)

Counter-Plaintiffs,

)

VS.

j

GERALD E. WEIT2 and CONSUELO J. WEITZ,
husband and wife, and WEITZ & SONS, LLC,
an Idaho Limited liability company,

)
)
)

Counter-Defendants.
.

1

1 This Amended Memorandum Decision supersedes and replaces this Court's Memorandum Decision which was
filed January 9, 2006. This decision takes into account and is in response to Defendants/Counter-Pl&Ws'
Motion to Clarify, Correct and Reconsider and Plaintiffs' response to that motion.

This Court is aware that Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) requires findings of fact and conclusions of law in
aU matters "tried upon the facts without a jury." This Memorandum Decision constitutes this Court's findings of
fact and condusions of law. Oitentimes, findings of facts and conclusions of law are set out separately and
distinctly even though they are not always separate and distinct. Other times conclusions of law are set out after
the findings of fact as if they somehow flow from the findings. However, it is sometimes necessary to ascertain
the law applicable before determining the facts. This Court believes it preferable to intersperse findings of fact
and conclusions of law (and not necessarily in that order) to make the decision and analysis more easily read and
understood.
2
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This case involves a boundary dispute in rural Latah County. The property in question
constitutes a portion of what is commonly referred to as Moscow Mountain. The dispute
involves two adjoining quarter sections of land. The property in dispute lies within the
southeast quarter of Section 8, Township 40 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian. Todd and
Tonia Green purchased the quarter section in question on August 1,2002. The quarter section
to the north of the disputed property is owned together by Gerald and Consuelo Weitz and
Weitz & Sons, LLC. Gerald and Consuelo Weitz, husband and wife, own the eastern half of
the quarter section to the north of the disputed property. The western half of the quarter
section is owned by Weitz & Sons, LLC. The members of Weitz & Sons, LLC, are Gerald and
Consuelo ~ e i t z ' a n dtheir two sons, Gerald Rockford Weitz and Dustin Fredrick Weitz. The
Weitzes wiU be collectiveIy referred to as the Weitz famiIy in this decision. (Attached to this
Memorandum Decision is a copy of Exhibit 0which was admitted in evidence. The area in
dispute has been highlighted in yellow on that Exhibit.)
The Greens, after purchasing the property, subdivided it into four parcels. Three of the
four parcels border the Weitz family's quarter section and thus contain property which is in
dispute. The Greens sold one of the four parcels to Danial and Catherine Castle (Tract 1 on
Exhibit 0). They sold another to Steven and Mary Shook (Tract 2 on Exhibit 0)The
. third
parcel impacted by this boundary dispute was retained by the Greens (Tract 4 on Exhibit 0).
The Castles, Shooks and Greens are all parties to this litigation. They all seek to quiet title to a
portion of the disputed property.
Todd and Tonia Green purchased what they thought was a quarter section, or 160
acres, from the Rogers' Family Trust. The Greens agreed to pay $2,000 per acre for the
property. Prior to purchasing the property, Todd Green spent considerable time traversing
the property. He had located a quarter section marker at the northeast corner of the property,
which had been placed by the Idaho Department of Lands in 1988. The property purchased
by the Greens contains a trail, sometimes referred to as a road, which runs generally east to
west through the disputed property. The road was the subject of considerable testimony at
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trial. Prior to the Greens' purchase in 2002, the trail was capable of handling, for much of its
length, a four-wheel, all-terrain vehicle. For at least a year prior to the Greens' purchase of the
property, the trail was partially blocked because a tree had fallen across it. The tree blocked
any motorized vehicle from driving the length of the trail. In order to travel the length of the
trail, motorcyclists and hikers created a detour by which they could bypass the tree that had
fallen across the trail.
Following the purchase of the property, the Greens hired Ron Monson, a land
surveyor, to subdivide their property. Mr. Monson began his work in August 2002. In the
process of surveying, he hung surveyor's tape on the property demonstrating that he was in
the process of surveying the property. As an apparent result of the surveyor's actions, the
Weitz family sprang into action. Ed Weitz, a nephew of Gerald Weitz, went up and cut out
the log that had fallen across the trail, thereby enabling motorized travel the length of the trail
without detour. Gerald Weitz, the Weitz family patriarch, took his Caterpillar tractor to the
property and on at least two different instances bladed the trail in such a way as to convert it
from an overgrown trail to one which would allow a four-wheel-drive pickup truck to travel
from one end to the other.
Todd Green, believing the property to be his and his wife's, telephoned Consuelo
Weitz, the Weitz family matriarch, to find out why the trail had been bladed without his
consultation or permission. Mrs. Weitz informed Mr. Green that she considered the property
to be hers and that she did not need permission to do what she considered to be rightfully
witkin her power to do. Mr. Green learned at that time that the Weitz family claimed
ownership of the northernmost portion of the quarter section he and his wife had purchased.
The claim of ownership extended from the northern boundary of the Greens' quarter section

to an old fence line that ran essentially the width of the property in an east-west direction and
would, if acknowledged as a boundary, result in a little more than eight acres being lopped off
of the northern portion of the Greens' property.
The Weitz family claims ownership of the disputed property because of Consuelo
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Weitz's family history and association with the property. Mrs. Weitz's father, Harold
Schoepflin, and her grandfather, Fred Schoepflin, previously ran dairy cattle on the disputed
property. It appears this was done until about 1975 Prior to that time the Schoepflins treated
the disputed property as their own. They graded the trail in questio~xat will and connected it
with numerous other roads traversing their property to the north. They maintained the fence,

which encroached on the Rogers' property. During the 1970's Homer Ferguson leased the
Rogers' property from Inez Rogers, the Rogers' family matriarch, to run cattle on it. Mr.
Ferguson testified that Mrs. Rogers told him in the mid-1970's that the fence, which borders

the disputed property, constituted the boundary between the Schoepflin's property and the
Rogers' property. However, Mrs. Rogers' son, Thomas Rogers, undermined the testimony
attributed to his mother when he testified that he doubted his mother had ever seen the fence
in question. He also testified his mother died in 2001 and he managed the property as the
trustee for his family's trust following her death. He also testified he considered the property
boundary to be the quarter section line, not the disputed fence.
After learning of the dispute regarding their property, Mr. and Mrs. Green made a
claim against the Rogers' Family Trust for the loss the Greens maintained they suffered as a
result of the warranty deed not conveying clear title to the disputed property. As a result of
the Greens' claim, the Rogers' Family Trust reduced the purchase price of the quarter section
Mr. and Mrs. Green purchased by $46,247.16. However, in negotiating the sale of property to
the Shooks and Castles, the Greens undertook an obligation to convey clear title to the
disputed property and, in the event the Weitz family did not pursue a quiet title action to the
disputed property, the Greens agreed to institute a quiet title action themselves. In addition,
the Greens agreed to compensate the Shooks and the Castles for the loss of the disputed
property in the event title was quieted in the Weitz family.
The Weitz family seeks to quiet title in the disputed property by asserting a claim of
boundary by agreement. In order to establish a boundary by agreement, the ~ e i t z
family must establish two things by clear and convincing evidence. See Luce v. Mlzrble, 142
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Idaho 264, _, 127 P.3d 167, 173-174 (2005) (citing Russ Ballard 13Family Achievement Inst. v.

Lava Hot Springs Resort, Inc., 97 Idaho 572,579,548 P.2d 72,79 (1976)). First, they must prove
an uncertain or disputed boundary involving adjacent properties; and second, they must
prove a subsequent express or implied agreement fixing the boundary. Cox v. Clanton, 137
Idaho 492,495, 50 P.3d 987, 990 (2002) (citing Grifil v. Reynolds, 136 Idaho 397,400,34 P.3d
1080,1083 (2001)).
Clearly there exists in this case a disputed boundary involving adjacent properties.
However, as to the express or implied agreement, the Weitz family has failed to make its case
by clear and convincing evidence. In 1988, the Idaho Department of Lands put up a marker
on the northeast corner of the Rogers' property. That boundary marker constituted notice
that the true property line between the Weitz family's property and the Rogers' property was
north of the fence in question. Thomas Rogers, the Rogers family's property manager,
testified that the boundary was not the dilapidated fence, but rather the comer established in
1988 by the Idaho Department of Lands. The only testimony that the Rogers family agreed to
the boundary was a thirty-year old statement attributed to Mrs. Rogers, who apparently had
little familiarity with the property.
Todd Green, in trying to find property to purchase, located the comer that had been
placed by the Idaho Department of Lands. The fence, which the Weitz family relies on, was,
in 2002, for all intents and purposes, non-existent. In the summer of 2005, when this Court

walked the length of the "fence," it would have been more descriptive to refer to it as the

remains of a fence than to refer to it as a "fence." It must have been many years between the
time this Court observed the "fence" and the time it served as a barrier to roaming cattle. As
between the "fence" and the quarter section marker placed by the Idaho Department of
Lands, the latter served as notice to the world where the true property boundary lay; the
"fence" would not have constituted notice of anything to anyone. Consequently, the Weitz
family's claim to a boundary by agreement fails.
The next issue that must be addressed is the claim by the Weitz family to a prescriptive

easement to the trail that traverses the disputed property. A prescriptive easement must also
be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225,23576 P.3d 969,
976 (2003). In order to prove a prescriptive easement, the Weitz family must demonstrate that
its use of the trail was as follows:
(1) open and notorious,
(2) continuous and uninterrupted,
(3) adverse and under a claim of right,
(4) with the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement, and

(5) for the statutory period of five years.
Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675,680,946 P.2d 975,980 (1997) (citingWest v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550,

557,511 P.2d 1326,1333 (1973); LC. 9 5-203).
While it may be true that the trail in question appears in the Weitz family's exhibits to
be part of a "seamless web" of roads on the Weitz family's property, it did not appear to be so
at the time the Greens bought the disputed property. In 2002, when the Greens purchased the
property, the trail looked like a footpath or a trail for a motorcycle or a four-wheel, all-terrain
vehicle (except where the log had fallen across the pathway and necessitated passage by some
other means). Prior to the Greens' purchase, the trail had been most recently bladed by Mrs.
Weitz's father around 1994. For the eight years prior to the Greens' purchase, the trail had
fallen into disuse. It did not appear, on the ground, to be part of a seamless web of roadways
extending onto the Weitz family's property.
Prior to the Greens' purchase, the trail had not been used by the Weitz family in a
continuous fashion for the required five years. Although there was evidence the Weitz family
and their friends used the trail periodically during the period in question, the use was not
continuous. Consequently, the Weitz family has failed to establish the elements necessary to
establish a prescriptive easement to the trail.

An additional impediment to the Weitz family establishing a prescriptive easement to
the road is that they cannot establish exclusive use of that road. In Simmons v. Perkins, 63
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Idaho 136,118 P.2d 740 (1941), the Idaho Supreme Court held: "[aln individual using land as
a road in common with the public cannot acquire a prescriptive right of way against the
owner." Id. at 144, 118 P.2d at 744. Numerous individuals, unconnected with the Weitz
family, used the trail during the time in question.

Because it is necessary to establish

exclusive use in order to prove a prescriptive easement, this is yet another reason why the
Weitz family's claim of a prescriptive easement must fail.
The next issue that needs to be addressed is whether the Greens were bona fide
purchasers. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Claim that Defendants Are Not Bona
Fide Purchasers for Value. "One who relies for protection upon the doctrine of being a bona
fide purchaser must show that at the time of the purchase he paid a valuable consideration
and upon the belief and validity of the vendor's claim of title without notice, actual or
constructive, of any outstanding adverse right of another." Imig v. McDonald, 77 Idaho 314,
318, 291 P.2d 852, 855 (1955) (citations omitted). This Court, having had the opportunity to
physically walk the fence line and hear the testimony at trial, is persuaded that the Greens
were bona fide purchasers of the disputed property. Much testimony was elicited regarding
the "fence." To characterize the remnants of what once constituted a fence as a fence is a
misnomer. The barbed wire has not held cattle for thirty years. The "fence" has lain on its
side for a significant number of years, if not decades. It is more accurately referred to as the
remains of a fence, not as a fence. The trail on the property was really nothing more than a
footpath. It would not have put a reasonably observant purchaser on notice that someone
other than the deeded owner of the property claimed title to the disputed property. The
Weitz family also made much of an old shack on the disputed property as well as a sign
placed on the property by either Mrs. Weitz's father or grandfather. The shack is a
dilapidated structure that has not been used in decades. To the extent it was seen prior to
purchase, it would not have put a purchaser on notice of a contrary claim to ownership.
Likewise the sign placed on a tree with the word "LINE" emblazoned on it would not have
put a bona fide purchaser on notice that the roughly eight acres in question were claimed by

another. Consequently, the Greens qualify as bona fide purchasers of the property.
The Weitz family also contends that the Greens should be estopped from asserting title
to the disputed property. The basis for this assertion is the fact that the Greens made a claim
against the Rogers' Family Trust and effected a reduction in price of the quarter section in
question because of the cloud on the title to the disputed property. The Weitz family argues
two forms of estoppel: equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel.

In order to establish equitable estoppel, the Weitz family must establish the following:
(1)a false representation or concealment of a material fact made with actual or constructive
knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting estoppel did not and could not have
discovered the truth; (3) an intent that the misrepresentation or concealment be relied upon;
and (4) that the party asserting estoppel relied on the misrepresentation or concealment to his
or her prejudice. Willig v.State, Depf. of Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 259,261,899 P.2d 969,971
(1995) (citations omitted).
Equitable estoppel does not apply to these facts. The Greens have not engaged in
either a false representation or a concealment of a material fact. The fact that the Rogers'
Family Trust reduced the purchase price to the Greens as a result of this dispute has never
been concealed from the Weitz family nor has there been a false representation. Further, there
is no prejudice which has inured to the Weitz family, even if one were to assume for purposes
of argument that there has been a concealment of a material fact. The Weitz family has not
changed its position in reliance on anything the Greens have done. They continue to
maintain, as they did prior to the Greens' settlement with the Rogers Family Tmst, that they
are the rightful owners of the property. There simply is nothing in these facts to establish
equitable estoppel as a basis for the Weitz family to challenge the Greens' purchase of the
disputed property.
The Weitz family also argues that quasi-estoppel should prevent the Greens from
claiming ownership to the disputed property. "The doctrine of quasi-estoppel may be
invoked against a person asserting a right inconsistent with a position previously taken by

him, with knowledge of the facts and lus rights, to the detriment of the person seeking to
apply the doctrine." Young v. Idaho Wep't of Law Enforcement, 123 Idaho 870,875,853 P.2d 615,
620 (Ct. App. 1993). "Quasi-estoppel does not require a false representation. Rather, it is a
doctrine designed to prevent one party from gaining an unconscionable advantage by
changing positions." Record Steel & Ci~nst.,Inc. v.Marfel Const., Inc., 129 Idaho 288, 292,923
P.2d 995,999 (Ct. App. 1996) (citations omitted).
The essence of quasi-estoppel is unconscionability. This Court is unpersuaded that the
actions of the Greens, in dealing with this dispute, should be construed as unconscionable.
While it is true that the Greens asserted a clqim against the Rogers' Family Trust and obtained
a significant reduction in the purchase price for the property because of the cloud on the title,
the Rogers' Family Trust had an unqualified obligation to defend the Greens' title to the
property, having given the Greens a warranty deed.

The Greens did nothing more than

assert their rights. White it may appear to some that the Greens have obtained a windfall by
being able to obtain a reduction of the price of the property and, at the same time, get all they
bargained for, it- should be remembered that the Greens have a contractual obligation to
defend the titles conveyed to the Shooks and Castles and, if unsuccessful, compensate the
Shooks and the Castles for the corresponding reduction in the value of their property. The
Rogers' Family Trust, in an effort to control its risk, essentially assigned its obligation to
defend the Greens' title to the Greens for a reduction in the price of the property. The Greens
have assumed that risk and have not engaged in any unconscionable behavior by undertaking
that risk. It may be that the Greens' decision was a good move from a business standpoint;
however, that is not the stuff of which unconscionability is made. Consequently, this Court
concludes that quasi-estoppel should not prevent the Greens from claiming title to the
property.
The Castles, Greens, and Shooks also claim that Mr. and Mrs. Weitz owe them
damages for timber trespass. The basis for this claim is as follows. After Mr. And Mrs. Weitz
learned that the Greens had obtained a settlement from the Rogers' Family Trust, they hired

an arborist, Dana Townsend, to replace the downed fence with one that would create a barrier
between their perceived property line and the property line of the Castles, Greens and
Shooks. Mr. Townsend cut down various trees of small diameter in order to build a new
fence. It is these trees that were downed, at the behest of Mr. and Mrs. Weitz, for which the
Castles, Greens and Shooks seek compensation. While there was testimony from Mr. Shook,
one of the property owners, that Mr. Townsend in effect created a "utility easemenf' across
the property, that testimony was an overstatement of the damage to the property. Dean
Balcamp, a real estate agent, testified that the value of the properties had not been impaired
by Mr. Townsend's timber trespass. Mr. Balcamp's testimony was far more credible than Mr.
Shook's as to the damage to the properties. While this Court concludes that the marketability
of the parcels owned by the Castles, Greens and Shooks has not been diminished by the
arborist, that is not the measure of damages. "In an action for timber trespass, the measure of
actual damages is based upon the amount of the trees taken and the market value of the trees
in that area at the time of the taking." Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629,640,862 P.2d
321,332 (Ct. App. 1993). While the trees cut were not marketable in the sense that they could
be milled and cut into dimension lumber (with the exception of one tree), they nevertheless
had some market value. The Court concludes that the Castles, Greens and Shooks should
each receive $500.00 for the market value of the timber trespass by Mr. Townsend at the
request of Mr. and Mrs. Weitz.
The Castles, Greens and Shooks also seek treble damages for the timber trespass.
"Although not stated in the statute, LC. 5 6-202 applies only where the alleged trespass is
shown to have been willful and intentional. " Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629,639,862
P.2d 321, 331 (Ct. App. 1993) (citations omitted). In its original Memorandum Decision, this
Court concluded that the trespass undertaken at the behest b; Mr. and Mrs. Weitz was not

willful and intentional. The Castles, Greens and Shooks have asked this Court to review this
concIusion and alter it. Defendantsjcounter-Plaintiffs' Brief In Support Of Motion To Clarify,
Correct And Reconsider; In Support Of The Request For Attorney Fees And In Support Of

The Memorandum Of Costs (filed April 3,2006). In support of the motion to reconsider this
Court has been provided with various excerpts of depositions and trial testimony which
establishes that Mrs. Weitz never received definitive word that the Weitz family's dispute
with the Greens had been resolved. However, the gravamen of the testimony was that it
appeared the dispute would go away. Mrs. Weitz testified at trial that she was advised by her
lawyer, Mr. Landeck, "[tlhat he anticipated settlement with the Rogers and he looked for the
whole problem to just go away." (Trial testimony of Consuelo Weitz, p. 38, 11. 24). Ron
Landeck, former counsel to the Weitz family, testified at lus deposition that he advised Mrs.
Weitz that the "problem may go away." (Deposition of Ron Landeck, p. 43, line 18.)
It appears clear that Mrs. Weitz was never advised that the problem had gone away.
Nevertheless, Mrs. Weitz became unreasonably optimistic when advised by her counsel that
the dispute might go away. She, and her arborist, pressed ahead. In order to be subject to
trebling of damages, the actions of Mr. and Mrs. Weitz must be willful and intentional, not
"merely negligent." Bumgamer v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629, 639,862 P.2d 321,331 (Ct. App.
1993). The facts establish that Mr. and Mrs. Weitz in pressing ahead were unreasonable.
However, the evidence fails to establish that the timber trespass attributable to Mr. and Mrs.
Weitz through the actions of Mr. Townsend was willful and intentional. When Mr. and Mrs.
Weitz hired Mr. Townsend, they unreasonably thought that the property dispute might have
been resolved by the Greens' settlement with the Rogers' Family Trust. They were negligent
in moving ahead, but their negligence does not arise to an intentional and willful act.
Consequently, the trespass engaged in by Mr. Townsend is not subject to trebling.
The final issue remaining for decision is the claim by the Castles, Greens and Shooks
that the title to their property has been slandered by the Weitz family. There are four essential
elements to a slander of title action. These include: "(1) The uttering and publication of the
slanderous words by the defendant [sic]; (2) the falsity of the words; (3) mdice, and (4) special
damages .

. . ." Matkeson v.Harris, 98 Idaho 758,759,572 P.2d 861,862 (1977). It appears that

the Weitz family slandered the Greens' title by making the assertions they did in their

complaint. The real questions presented are whether the actions of the Weitz family were
malicious and whether the Greens can show special damages. "Malice has been generally
defined by Idaho courts as a reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of a statement."
Weaver v. Stafford, 134 Idaho 691, 701, 8 P.3d 1234, 1244 (2000). As to this component, it
appears that the Weitz family was reckless in its challenge to the Greens' title. As an
example, the complaint alleges that the hogwire fence on the eastern portion of the disputed
property "extended southerly along the eastern boundary of the Disputed Property to its
intersection with the fence and fenceline to keep intruders from trespassing on the NE 1/4
of said Section 8 and the Disputed Property." Complaint at

7 21.

This statement is false.

Further, it was reckless of the Weitz family to make this assertion. Consequently, malice
has been established. The final remaining question is whether the Greens can establish
special damages. If they can, then all of the elements of a slander of title claim will have been
proven. A review of the case law indicates that attorney's fees constitute "special damages"
for purposes of creating a primafacie case of slander of title. See Ray1 v. Shull Enterprises, Inc.,

108 Idaho 524,530, 700 P.2d 567,573 (1984). Consequently, the Castles, Greens and Shooks
have proven the Weitz family slandered their title.
Counsel for the Castles, Greens and Shooks are directed to submit judgments that will
quiet titIe in the disputed property to them and award $500.00 each to the Castles, Greens and
Shooks for the timber trespass they experienced. Judgment in these amounts should be
against Mr. and Mrs. Weitz since the evidence was that they hired Mr. Townsend. Having
concluded that the Greens are entitled to special damages under their slander of title claim,
attorney's fees will be dealt with elsewhere in a separate decision.

DATED this

.(h

day of June 2006.
CI_

J& R. Stegner
District Judge
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